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New generation trade agreements mark a new era in the contentious relationship between 
the right to health and global trade objectives. This article delineates three of the unique 
qualities of new generation agreements and the contemporary challenges they pose to the 
global governance of health. Specifically, new generation agreements encompass new 
fields not traditionally included in trade deals, enable forum shopping and alternative 
governance structures, and legitimize corporations as participants in normative and 
regulatory processes while condoning a new standard of state accountability to 
corporations. This article examines opportunities to enhance coherence between human 
rights and new generation trade agreements. These measures include recognizing and 
complying with the right to health and human rights law in trade agreements, 
strengthening the policy space to protect and promote health and human rights 
considerations in trade and investment negotiations, and establishing a Framework 
Convention on Global Health as a new reference for rights-based global health 
governance. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
New generation trade agreements mark a new era in the contentious relationship between 
the right to health and global trade objectives. This article explores how new generation 
trade agreements have encroached on global governance for health and the potential for the 
fullest enjoyment of the right to health. This paper also examines whether and how 
international human rights law and principles can bolster global governance for health in 
light of the challenges posed by new generation trade agreements. The term “new generation 
trade agreements” emphasizes their novel and far-reaching focus on issues “beyond-the-
border,” including investment protection, and regulatory governance. Recent notable 
examples are the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), which are bilateral or plurilateral trade deals that aim to 
govern not only the trade in goods, but also investment, trade in services, and regulatory 
cooperation. Although many aspects of new generation trade agreements have long been 
part of international trade negotiations, new generation deals i) extend deeper into national 
policies and affect the governance of services, investment, regulatory principles, and 
cooperation; ii) have more comprehensive coverage, with a push for top-down and opt-out 
measures with limited exclusions from these arrangements; and iii) include investment 
arbitration or dispute settlement and oversight on compliance, consequently strengthening 
their role and relevance in domestic affairs far beyond that of other international 
agreements.  
The authors first show examples where conflicts have historically emerged 
between trade and health. The second part of this article investigates the meaning and 
implications of human rights and the right to health obligations of states in the context of 
global trade. The third section delineates the unique qualities of new generation trade 
agreements and the contemporary challenges they pose to the global governance of health. 
The fourth part identifies opportunities for greater coherence between human rights and 
new generation trade agreements. 
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GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE AND TRADE 
 
In contrast to international development and United Nations (UN) agencies, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) has a stronger normative role and mandate in global health 
policy making. WHO inherited specific tasks for medicines standardization, epidemic 
control, and quarantine measures from the League of Nations and the International Office 
for Public Health.1 The role of WHO has always been associated with trade policies, albeit 
in the context of controlling disease transmission.2 Additionally, WHO shares with Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN the responsibility for standards, guidelines, 
and codes of practice adopted by the Codex Alimentarius Commission.3 
The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 raised 
concerns about the future of WHO’s role in global health governance. These concerns were 
triggered by questions about the legitimacy of public health measures, and by negotiations 
on services trade and intellectual property rights. One of the most debated WTO agreements 
in the field of public health has been the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS), which addresses how and on what basis governments can regulate public health 
matters. Another example is the WTO dispute settlement case on asbestos, a known 
carcinogen, that directly challenged European occupational health regulation and a ban of 
asbestos on the basis of the WHO International Agency for the Research on Cancer’s (IARC) 
assessment of carcinogenicity.4 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) has 
drawn attention to the labeling of products such as tobacco notably through a trade-related 
dispute on clove cigarettes.5 Services negotiations have resulted in fewer dispute settlement 
cases under WTO than trade in goods; however, the dispute settlement case on gambling 
shows that trade-related obligations could have consequences for bans on trade in services, 
which may be interpreted as setting a zero quota, which would be impermissible under 
market access requirements.6 
The most controversial WTO agreement influencing global health governance is 
the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
Intellectual property (IP) disputes and concerns about access to medicines have shaped 
WHO’s role and position as a global normative actor in pharmaceutical policy. While some 
WHO member states and nongovernmental organizations sought a stronger role for WHO 
on access to medicines and regulation, the pharmaceutical industry and sympathetic 
member states have opposed this change.7  Forum shopping, made possible by the 
International Conference on Harmonization (ICH), is viewed as a means to limit and 
counteract WHO’s role in standard-setting in pharmaceutical policy.8  
Conflicts between trade and health priorities have come to a head in the field of 
tobacco policy. In 2001, the WHO Tobacco Free Initiative published a paper on confronting 
the tobacco epidemic in the era of trade liberalization.9 This contributed to negotiations on 
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which entered into force in 2005. In 
2014, investment liberalization and protection became a new concern for tobacco control.10 
Bilateral trade agreements and so called TRIPS-plus requirements have also become 
reflected as a concern for health policy and debated under WHO Commissions, 
intergovernmental working groups, and plans of action on public health and intellectual 
property rights.11   
The negotiation of the FCTC forms the hard end of global health law, as it remains 
the sole convention negotiated under WHO.12 The International Health Regulations (IHR) 
are based on Article 21 and represent legally binding regulations. WHO has also actively 
engaged with trade-related matters in the field of mobility of health care professionals, 
where a global code of practice has been negotiated on the international recruitment of 
healthcare personnel.13  While WHO codes have weak enforcement mechanisms, the codes 
remain authoritative recommendations.  WHO codes can help governments legitimize their 
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action in the context of national regulatory measures to protect public health and their 
position against powerful corporate or foreign state interests.  
In global governance and trade, WTO agreements have become the floor when 
compared to bilateral and plurilateral agreements, such as the Trade in Services Agreement 
(TiSA). Bilateral agreements and plurilateral agreements have become vehicles to advance 
trade terms beyond what has been achieved under WTO agreements, with often implicit or 
explicit aims to eventually take these under the auspices of WTO. New generation trade 
agreements have gained the most attention in the context of the recent TTIP and TPP 
negotiations. This article focuses on TTIP and TPP, as the negotiating texts are accessible 
and likely to be revisited in the future in other agreements, even though negotiations are 
currently stalled. 
The focus on regulatory cooperation and rules is thus likely to challenge how future 
standards and regulation are set, for which purposes, and on what institutional and legal 
bases.  Thus, while new generation trade agreements may “restore” the right to regulate, 
they may exert influence on the policy space for governments to regulate for  health.14  As 
discussion has so far been focused on conflicts between trade and national policy priorities, 
we seek to point out their role not only in shaping national policies, but influencing where 
and how global health policies and standard-setting takes place. While they do not “oppose” 
WHO’s constitutional role, they create an alternative, more strongly enforced regime for 
global governance, which draws from interests of global industries and priorities of global 
trade and investor interests.  
 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND RIGHTS TO HEALTH  
 
The right to the highest attainable standard of health, first articulated in the WHO 
Constitution,15 is now enshrined in multiple UN treaties, among them the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which is legally 
binding on the 165 ratifying states.16 The right to health, together with all human rights, 
impose specific obligations on governments and bestow universal entitlements on 
individuals by virtue of their intrinsic worth and human dignity. 
The value of international human rights law to global governance is threefold. 
First, human rights are inclusive, universal, and interdependent in scope,17 which allows 
complex systems of global governance to be refocused through the lens of individuals and 
whether they can enjoy their right to health. Second, international human rights law is a 
legally binding set of rules to which governments should be held to account. Legal 
recognition enhances the permanency of rights, and their implementation and enforcement. 
Third, a rights-based approach, enshrined in human rights law, considers the individual an 
active member of decision-making processes rather than a passive consumer, which is often 
the case in a market-oriented paradigm.18 Individuals are empowered to take an active role 
in policymaking, implementation, and enforcement in line with human rights principles of 
non-discrimination, transparency, consultation/participation, monitoring, accountability, 
and redress. 
The scope of human rights obligations vis-a-vis global trade can be distilled from 
authoritative “general comments” by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR), a UN body of human rights experts that interprets and clarifies the scope 
and content of these entitlements.  
The notion that trade agreements must be compatible with and not limit the 
enjoyment of human rights has persisted in the CESCR’s jurisprudence since 1999.19 For 
example, bilateral or multi-layer international agreements could harmonize contributory 
social security schemes for migrant workers, enhancing social protection for this vulnerable 
group.20 However, this guidance is not necessarily heeded in practice. 
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States are instructed to ensure that international agreements they enter into do not 
adversely impact rights, such as to health or to water.21 Human rights violations occur when 
governments fail to account for these rights in trade deals.22 The CESCR specifically 
cautions that “agreements concerning trade liberalization should not curtail or inhibit a 
country’s capacity to ensure the full realization of” the rights to water or to social security.23 
The CESCR has additionally established that any higher protection standards in national or 
international law, such as for intellectual property, must not impede the enjoyment of other 
human rights without justification, such as the provision of essential medicines as part of 
the right to health.24   
In contrast to traditional IP-focused trade agreements, the novel terms in new 
generation trade agreements are largely unaddressed by international human rights law. 
These human rights obligations are legally binding on states and can be enforced through 
domestic courts, where permitted by law, and recently in an international forum under the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which is described in more detail later.  
The CESCR also offers guidance for international organizations and their 
members. Member states must fully consider the rights to water and social security in the 
organization’s actions.25 The CESCR encourages the incorporation of international human 
rights law and principles into the workings of international organizations, and effective 
cooperation between the WTO and states, specifically to implement the right to health and 
social security.26 
 
NEW GENERATION TRADE AGREEMENTS AND GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE  
 
Global trade policies are all too often at odds with national public health interests. In trade 
negotiations, nation states are set against one another to reach an agreement that is 
perceived to represent a rules-based compromise between a variety of national interests. 
Yet less attention has been paid to how new generation trade agreements affect the policy 
space for health at both the global and the national levels. Indeed, common health policy 
interests are often in conflict with those of commercial policy.27 Furthermore, new 
generation trade agreements can be seen to serve corporate interests to the detriment of 
public health regulation.28 In contrast to the more mundane export interest squabbles, 
health-related concerns are more systemic and globalized, as national governments pursue 
universal health coverage and the right to health. Furthermore, the control of antimicrobial 
resistance and the prevention of epidemics increasingly hinges on well-functioning health 
care systems. Thus, a global perspective on the conflict between trade and health agendas is 
warranted.  Some global and national health policies aim to restrict and limit commercial 
activities that are related to the manifestation or transmission of disease, such as tobacco 
control to prevent non-communicable diseases.  Public health policy also aims to ensure a 
high level of health protection, including for access to medicines and occupational health 
and safety.  Thus, new generation trade agreements and their enlarged focus on regulation 
have implications for the health policy space at national and global levels.29   
New generation trade agreements affect global health governance in three ways: i) 
expanding the reach of trade agreements to new fields not traditionally encompassed by 
trade deals (e.g., regulatory cooperation and principles, investment protection, services); ii) 
enabling forum shopping and alternative governance structures (e.g., International Council 
for Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), 
labor, environmental and gender chapters); and iii) legitimizing corporations as 
participants in normative and regulatory processes while condoning a new standard of state 
accountability to corporations. The authors will first examine these three aspects before 
discussing the potential and limits of human rights in this context. 
 
120 KOIVUSALO & PEREHUDOFF, FUTURE FOR THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
 
 
GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, VOLUME XII, NO. 1 (SPRING 2018) HTTP://WWW.GHGJ.ORG 
New Generation Trade Agreements as a New Global Constitutional Reference (“Hard 
Law”) 
 
New generation trade agreements establish frameworks to regulate and protect the 
interests of global industries on one hand and as means to limit national regulatory policy 
space that could restrict trade on the other. Indeed, it has been claimed that WTO 
obligations, or “hard law,” should trump public health policies even in the case of tobacco 
and the FCTC.30 However, such claims are highly contested. While the challenges for 
domestic policies are evident,31 there is no reason why this should be the case for global 
agreements and priorities. However, as long as trade negotiations are held from a 
commercial—rather than a health—perspective, there will be little to contest. In WHO, the 
challenge of “stagnation” is reflected in lengthy and arduous World Health Assembly 
meetings, intergovernmental working groups, and inertia concerning normative global 
health policy issues, most notably with respect to pharmaceuticals.  
Negotiations under the services agenda on the mutual recognition of 
qualifications, the trade in health services and mobility of patients and health providers, and 
the portability of social insurance are all likely to affect the governance of health systems. 
While many countries have opted out of including health services under trade agreements, 
the negative listing of services commitments (or use of more general obligations covering 
all sectors in new generation agreements) limits the scope for their exclusion.32 
Furthermore, new generation trade agreements do little to address or strengthen global 
regulatory measures for human trafficking and illegal trade in human organs.33 New 
generation trade agreements have emphasized the enforcement of IP rights and action on 
counterfeited goods, while simultaneously complicating the control of falsified and 
substandard products.  
One aspect of the new “hard law” is related to the legitimacy and the practice of 
investment arbitration. The globalization of investment protection through new generation 
trade and investment agreements is perhaps the most important aspect of these agreements. 
Arbitration cases on tobacco,34 access to medicines,35 and health services36 have already 
challenged domestic public health regulation. However, the greatest ramification for health 
policy is anticipated to be the resulting regulatory chill and reluctance of governments to act 
as a result of the threat of arbitration37.    
 
Enabling Forum Shopping  (“Competence and Legitimacy”) 
 
As long as trade agreements focus on trade barriers there may be spillover 
implications. However, regulatory measures or sector-specific chapters in trade agreements 
transform these deals into alternative forums with far greater implications for global 
governance.  
The ICH is an example of forum shopping enabled through global normative 
policies.38  While harmonization has its benefits, it can also lead to lower standards when 
led by commercial—rather than health—priorities39. Furthermore, while the focus of the 
ICH is currently limited, it has the potential for expanding its relevance in the future. 
Evidence suggests that enhancement of harmonization has taken place at the expense of 
safety standards. For example, the ICH management of the regulatory standards for 
carcinogenicity testing concern reducing the testing requirements, rather than harmonizing 
inconsistent standards, across regions.40 The changing role and legitimacy of the ICH 
(currently known as International Council for Harmonization) as part of trade policies 
challenges WHO’s role not only as a forum for the harmonization of limited technical 
standards, but potentially also its role in establishing broader normative guidelines and 
priorities in pharmaceutical policy. The European Union will likely promote the ICH in 
trade agreements due to its close links with the European Commission. However, WHO 
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matters and health-related regulatory policies remain the territory of member states’ 
ministries of health. The European Union proposal and inclusion of ICH in trade 
agreements as a main reference organization creates an alternative agency comparable with 
WHO, which has now become the “residual” option. New generation trade agreements 
define ICH as the primary agency and avenue for harmonization and guidelines, without 
reference to the focus of these guidelines. For example, EU proposal for TTIP Article 5 of 
Annex on medicines requires: 
 
 3.   The Parties shall implement all ICH and VICH guidelines unless those would 
be ineffective or inappropriate for the achievement of their legitimate objectives. 
Each Party should duly consider, when developing or implementing requirements, 
guidelines and procedures for the authorisation of medicinal products that are not 
harmonised by ICH or VICH, the scientific or technical guidelines developed by 
the other organisations mentioned in Article 4.41 
 
In the same way, the International Standardization Organization (ISO) has become 
legitimized as the standard-setting reference agency under WTO agreements, negotiations 
on new generation trade agreements seek to focus on how and where technical standards, 
requirements, and licensing are set for services and establishment. Furthermore, new 
generation trade agreements expand the roles of technical standards and standardization 
from matters addressed between industries, to providing less restrictive measures for trade 
as alternatives to public regulatory measures.42 
Another avenue for forum shopping is based on the inclusion of new chapters and 
clauses addressing social, environmental, labor, and gender issues as part of trade 
agreements. While this can be seen as means to improve trade policies and enhance the 
scope for enforcement (e.g., International Labor Organization conventions), it can also be 
seen as means to i) make trade agreements more socially acceptable, ii) limit ambition, 
reduce or undermine existing regulations achieved in other fora with focus on basic 
obligations, and iii) create a process where trade agreements are considered as appropriate 
forums for regulatory action on all issues.  
 
Legitimizing Corporations as Participants in Normative and Regulatory Processes, and 
Condoning a New Standard of State Accountability to Corporations for Their Policy 
Measures 
 
The European Union proposals for regulatory cooperation and principles in TTIP 
and provisions on regulatory coherence in TPP include, as a starting point, early information 
and engagement with stakeholders.43 These proposals represent in essence slight 
modifications to the United States’ practices of regulatory impact assessment, stakeholder 
consultation, and participation in the policy process.44 The regulatory impact assessment 
requirements impose a substantial burden of proof on governments, which are duty-bound 
to take measures for transparency and stakeholder consultation. This informs stakeholders 
when, where, and how governments seek to restrict markets or impose regulation early in 
the policymaking process.  
The rules on regulatory cooperation build on the practices of the United States and 
on initial market access rules that require public policies to show the necessity of the 
particular measure and that it is the least restrictive on trade and investment. New 
generation trade agreements essentially shift the burden of proof from corporations to 
public regulators, as well as make markets the norm – and public services and public 
regulation the exception.  This is reflected also in the chapters on investment and state-
owned enterprises for TTIP.45   
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While stakeholder consultation could in theory stimulate public participation in 
the process of policy-making, stakeholder groups are likely to have very different capacities 
to participate in global forums. Large coalitions and corporate participation in trade 
negotiations tend to result in policymaking “stickiness,” with a default preference for less 
trade restrictive policies. Corporate representatives gain entry to these processes as 
participants, and they have substantial resources at hand to shape the discussions for their 
benefit. Industries and their consultancies can easily outspend (directly or indirectly) non-
governmental organizations and international agencies participating in the same process. 
For example, the tobacco industry was excluded from the negotiations of FCTC.46 It would 
be legitimate to question the extent to which corporate stakeholder engagement is geared 
more toward undermining rather than contributing to regulatory processes.     
One view of investment protection is as a government watch-dog – to ensure that 
new legislative proposals are aligned with key stakeholder interests. While investment 
agreements do not directly limit the scope of global health governance, they do restrict the 
policy space at the national level as well as strengthen accountability toward investors in 
comparison to health policy priorities and public interest. Until now, the focus on 
investment protection procedures has concentrated on clauses that limit expropriation, yet 
it is likely that fair and equitable treatment (FET), or minimum standards as it is defined in 
TPP, will form an equally important avenue for pressure toward governments. Investment 
arbitration has implications for the role of public health priorities in both national and 
global governance.  In addition to the case of tobacco, increasing concern is cast on 
pharmaceutical policies and the scope and potential to use compulsory licensing or limit 
data exclusivity to ensure the affordability of medicines.47 This potential has been 
anticipated in the proposed TPP expropriation clause, which specifically enshrines a public 
health exception to investment arbitration as follows:   
 
For greater certainty and without limiting the scope of this subparagraph, 
regulatory actions to protect public health include, among others, such measures 
with respect to the regulation, pricing and supply of, and reimbursement for, 
pharmaceuticals (including biological products), diagnostics, vaccines, medical 
devices, gene therapies and technologies, health-related aids and appliances and 
blood and blood-related products.48 
 
NEW GENERATION TRADE AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS  - FRIENDS OR FOES? 
 
The role of human rights as part of trade agreements gained ground in the 1990s and the 
early 2000s, as human rights compliance was considered in European Union trade 
agreements.49 Human rights and social clauses as part of trade deals have been 
implemented predominantly in trade agreements with poorer countries.50 The role and 
relevance of human rights is, however, dependent on how they relate to other chapters and 
to the existing legal framework in countries.  Furthermore, the European Union has diluted 
human rights obligations in the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) to the extent that questions have been raised whether the proposed text 
complied with the EU’s policy that all economic agreements must contain a human rights 
clause.51 This example raises the question of whether and to what extent new generation 
trade agreements represent a departure from the EU emphasis on human rights in trade 
deals. UN Special Rapporteurs on the right to health have drawn attention to specific 
implications of trade agreements, such as access to health care and medicines.52 In this 
context, attention has been drawn to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, which 
stipulates that “in the event of conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” Moreover, the Vienna 
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Convention on the Law of Treaties states that treaties have to be taken into account that 
apply between countries. In a similar vein, the UN Independent Expert on the promotion of 
a democratic and equitable international order, Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, has emphasized 
“the priority of the international human rights regime, including the International 
Covenants as well as FAO, ILO, UNICEF and WHO conventions over conflicting obligations 
under trade and investment agreements.”53 His report also changes the perspective from 
directly addressing conflicts with the right to health of individuals toward the role and 
capacity of governments to ensure policy space and democratic accountability for realizing 
human rights.   
The approach in new generation trade agreements remains uncharted territory for 
human rights despite extensive guidance on the contours of human rights obligations by the 
CESCR. First, authoritative interpretations of the right to health have long held that states 
are obliged to protect health rights from encroachment by third parties and to take steps to 
regulate the business environment to support third parties’ discharge of their human rights 
obligations.54  Now, new generation trade agreements tread into these sovereign waters of 
states and strain their right to regulate, for example to control tobacco consumption or 
control costs of pharmaceuticals. The most challenging issues for rights articulation arise 
from government measures, which seek to control costs or limit markets under the notion 
that human rights obligations could be met by spending more. 
Second, corporate actors increasingly infiltrate the trade policy space that has 
historically, and appropriately, been limited to state-to-state action for negotiation, 
agreement, implementation, and enforcement. Human rights principles enshrined in 
international law derive their force on national governments from their legally binding 
nature and representation as a global consensus of (minimum) moral imperatives.55  
However, business actors fall outside of the traditional accountability relationship between 
the state and an individual.  
Third, extra-judicial arbitration on matters of national public policy also pose 
significant challenges to the application and implementation of human rights principles. 
Extra-judicial arbitration (i.e., ISDS) that minimizes, if not entirely eliminates, 
transparency, public participation/consultation, and accountability of the proceedings is 
anathema to a human rights approach. Even when such proceedings are open to 
consultation with third parties, well-resourced corporate interests may dwarf public interest 
representatives in number and expertise. 
Extra-judicial arbitration serves to assess investment disputes, a method that 
allows corporations to allege a public policy measure violates their investment rights. 
Concerns have been raised about the weight, if any, accorded to a state’s human rights 
obligations when adjudicating these claims. However, the prominent investment dispute 
filed by cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris against the government of Uruguay’s plain 
packaging law offers some hope for the salience of human rights in international arbitration. 
The 2016 decision by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
affirmed that governments have the discretion to take measures to protect the right to 
health, thereby establishing an important precedent on human rights over commercial 
interests.56 Yet, the absence of explicit human rights considerations in new generation trade 
agreements risks offering only muted protection and promotion of human rights out of 
benevolence rather than legal obligation. 
Ultimately, the danger exists that human rights law is under-equipped to address 
the novel terrain of new generation trade agreements. Because only states, and not 
corporate actors, are legally bound by international human rights law, authoritative 
guidance on human rights responsibilities of corporate actors is derived from the consensus 
document, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the ‘Ruggie Principles’). The 
Ruggie Principles were endorsed by the Human Rights Council in 2009.57 These novel 
guidelines reinforce the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, 
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including business actors; to establish corporate actors’ responsibility to respect human 
rights; and to advocate for improved access to effective remedies for abuses.  However, no 
forum exists to ensure corporate accountability to and enforcement of these 
responsibilities.58 Without legal recognition and an accountability mechanism, the force of 
human rights on business actors is significantly diluted when compared to the implications 
for governments. 
In summary, the foci of new generation trade agreements on regulatory measures 
and investment protection pose new challenges from a human rights perspective. 
Regulatory measures encroach on states’ obligations to regulate to protect the right to 
health. Corporate actors, who play an increasingly prominent role in new generation 
agreements, have human rights responsibilities despite scarce opportunities for their 
enforcement. Investment protection through extra-judicial arbitration sidesteps domestic 
law and courts, effectively muting any accountability mechanisms or human rights practices 
built into them. Trade and investment agreements no longer affect only specific policy 
measures, but now encompass regulatory processes more deeply and broadly to the extent 
that they can evolve to replace existing institutions and forms of governance.  
Human rights law remains under equipped to address the novel terrain of new 
generation trade agreements in two manners. One, legitimizing corporations as actors 
dilutes the force of human rights framework, which is weak in addressing matters outside 
of the state-individual relationship. Two, extra-judicial arbitration on matters of national 
health policy effectively removes dispute settlement from democratic oversight of the 
national judiciary or other domestic body and thereby reduces, if not eliminates, important 
aspects of a human rights approach: transparency, participation, and accountability. Extra-
judicial arbitration minimizes attention to the state’s human rights obligations toward 
health and maximizes the focus on state-corporation interaction. 
An important tension between human rights and trade rules concerns the degree 
to which they can be enforced and in which fora.  To address these tensions, the right to 
health needs to have legal implications beyond rights-based approaches to health.59 Dispute 
settlement in WTO and investment arbitration has not been open to human rights 
arguments. Furthermore, the arbitration process is not open, transparent, or balanced in 
relation to access to justice. Investment arbitration may also be more about power and 
accountability than formal judicial measures or access to justice in principle, i.e., the large 
financial threat of arbitration can in practice be of more concern for policy-makers than a 
potential violation of human rights obligations without effective sanctions.  
 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUPPORT OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FOR HEALTH 
 
Despite little consideration for human rights as part of global trade law, human rights do 
open a potential avenue to address conflicts in global health governance. While new 
generation agreements and international arbitration may undermine the relevance of 
human rights obligations, this risk can be mitigated by strengthening the role, 
interpretation, and position of human rights law in the context of global trade, and 
specifically within new generation trade agreements and in dispute settlements.  
New generation trade and investment agreements, exemplified by the current TPP 
and TTIP negotiating text, raise concerns for global health governance and the full 
realization of human rights. The challenge for WHO is one of both governance and existence 
if trade and investment agreements shape the broader framework for public policies. 
Possible avenues of action include i) recognizing and complying with the right to health and 
human rights law in trade agreements;60 ii) strengthening the policy space to protect and 
promote health and human rights considerations in trade and investment negotiations and 
dispute settlements;61 and iii) establishing a Framework Convention on Global Health as a 
new reference for rights-based global health governance.62 The Framework Convention on 
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Global Health63 could bridge a number of health priorities and support a public health 
approach to a range of issues, from access to and rational use of medicines to sustainable 
health care financing and the control of antimicrobial resistance.64 A Framework 
Convention on Global Health could also introduce much-needed enforcement mechanisms, 
solidify the role and responsibilities of non-state actors such as corporations, and adopt a 
rights-based approach to address the challenges in new generation trade agreements. If an 
international convention is required to protect the national policy space for health and to 
promote human rights, then there should be a strong preference to establish it under WHO’s 
auspices. WHO’s constitutional obligations and normative track-record on health could 
form a robust starting point for negotiating such a convention. As a convener, WHO could 
ensure coherence between the convention and the current normative and regulatory global 
health policies. 
It is likely that none of these measures will alone be sufficient, and thus these 
initiatives should be seen as complementary measures.  
In addition, the ICESCR Optional Protocol offers the potential to address breaches 
of the right to health that manifest as result of state action in the context of trade 
agreements. The ICESCR Optional Protocol is a landmark international enforcement 
mechanism of social rights before a quasi-judicial body that is empowered to make 
recommendations to ratifying states.  
Until now, global governance for health has been insufficiently supported by the 
restricted scope of human rights in trade agreements. Going forward, building the 
relationship between the right to health and global governance for health will require further 
investigation into how regulatory processes relate to human rights and on what basis 
governments are required to act to honor their human rights obligations. Human rights can 
be an important trigger for governments to ensure health protection and universal health 
coverage in the face of new generation trade agreements.   
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